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The Familiar Stranger of Mental Health 
An autoethnographical account of multiple and competing identities of a former 
patient, campaigner and service user.   
Abstract:  
Purpose- The paper contributes to the debate about the closure of institutional mental 
health care facilities, from an experiential perspective of a former mental health 
inpatient, ongoing service user and campaigner for retention of such facilties. It argues 
that auto-ethnographic accounts of mental illness by those with multiple social 
identities can have a greater role in terms of future training of mental health care 
professionals.  
Design/methodology/ approach- The paper offers an experiential account of the 
impact of mental health facility bed closures as (a) a patient admitted to institutional 
mental health facilities; (b) as a mental health campaigner, fighting for the provision of 
both places of safety and ‘safe space’ within his own local community and (c) as an 
ongoing service user. The research is in the interpretivist tradition of social science in 
taking an autoethnographical methodological stance.  
Findings- The paper is underpinned by two key theoretical notions. Firstly, Stuart 
Hall’s concept of the ‘Familiar Stranger’ (2017) is used to explore the tensions of self-
identity as the author uncomfortably between his three-fold statuses. Secondly the 
notion of ‘ontological insecurity’ offered by Giddens (1991) is utilised with the paper 
exploring the paradox that admission to a mental health so-called ‘place of safety’ is 
in fact itself a disorientating experience for both patient and carer(s).  
Research limitations/ implications - No positivistic claims to reliability, 
representativeness or generalisability cab be made. It is the authenticity of the account 
which the reader feels should be afforded primacy in terms of its original contribution 
to knowledge. 
 
Practical implications - The paper should have practical utility for those tasked with 
developing educational and training curriculums for professionals across the mental 
health care sector. 
Social implications- The paper implicitly assesses the political wisdom of the policy 
of mental health bed closures within the wider context of the deinstitutionalisation 
movement.  
Originality/ value- This paper is underpinned by original experiential accounts.  
Keywords- familiar stranger; ontological insecurity; self-identity; autoethnography; 
mental health institutional closures; deinstitutionalisation; place of safety; risk; training 
and education.  
Paper type- Viewpoint. 
 
Introduction 
As I pick up the remote control to turn off the TV late one night, a Lloyds bank Mental 
Health UK campaign is on the screen. I’m being treated to a diet of celebrities as they 
sport yellow post-it notes on their foreheads. From the political and journalistic worlds 
there’s Alastair Campbell and Jeremy Paxman respectively and the familiar face of 
Olympic cycling champion Victoria Pendleton. The post-its carry a range of mental 
health conditions which cannot be seen by those wearing them on their foreheads. 
There’s everything from ‘Stress’ to ‘Paranoia’. In carrying the hashtag 
‘GetTheInsideOut’, recipients of the mental health labels face the camera and ask - 
“Am I going to live?”; “Could mind make me hurt myself?”  and “Would they say that 
guy is nuts?”; are all articulated. After hitting the ‘off’ button and making my way 
upstairs I shake my head wondering how visible to others has the writing on my yellow 
post-it been today? How have my ruminatory thoughts been dealt with and self-
managed? Have I felt the need to compulsively confess to anything to my colleagues 
at the University where I am employed?.  
Unlike those who appeared in the advert, in many ways I wear not one but three post-
its on my forehead for I am (1) a former mental health inpatient; (2) an ongoing service 
user and (3) an active mental health campaigner. Whilst I like to wear only one post-it 
at any given time sometimes I am unaware when one has dropped off my forehead 
onto the floor and at other times I’m not consciously aware that another yellow note 
has appeared above my eye brows. At various points in my life my forehead has 
become clustered as all three post-it notes have appeared messily, side by side or on 
top of each other. This has to be contexualised by my often contradictory attitudes 
towards deinstitutionalisation. This is a hugely contentious issue in mental health care 
provision because despite governmental promises of extra funding a significant 
number of mental health trusts have been forced to cut the number of acute mental 
health beds. In this context, Helm and Campbell (2018) pointed out that the number of 
hospital beds for people with acute mental health conditions, where a consultant 
psychiatrist is on hand as an overseer of treatment, has fallen by approximately30% 
in the last decade (from 26,448 in 2009 to 18,082 in early 2018).  
In exploring my attitudes to deinstitutionalisation, this paper is underpinned by two key 
theoretical notions. Firstly, the notion of ‘ontological insecurity’. This concept is 
inextricably bound up with notions of our identity and a sense of stability. According to 
Giddens (1991: 92) “The phrase refers to the confidence that most humans beings 
have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding 
social and material environments.”    It’s critical to appreciate that as Giddens (1990; 
1991) has pointed out, this cannot be merely reduced to a pathology of the mind- In 
drawing on the work of Erik Erikson (1965) on ‘trust’ in early childhood, Giddens 
acknowledges that whilst only a minority of people may be labelled as being mentally 
ill, it is possible that a significant proportion of the population are living with their sense 
of being and existence in the world being constantly challenged and undermined in 
late modern times. There is the constant threat of job losses; mortgage repayments; 
relationship terminations- to name but three things which add to our sense of social 
disorientation and this is when we are ‘well’. When afflicted by mental health problems, 
in addition to the pressures of late modern living, it is not unreasonable to suggest that 
any remaining sense of ontological security is completely undermined and this is 
explore later in this paper. 
Secondly, this paper employ’s Hall’s (2017) notion of the ‘Familiar Stranger’, taken 
from the autobiographical account of the late cultural theorist Stuart Hall (2017), who 
acknowledges that the intellectual inspiration for this concept has in part to be credited 
to the work of the German sociologist Georg Simmel (1964). We will explore how the 
concept of the ‘Familiar Stranger’ perfectly encapsulates the fact that we all have 
multiple and competing identities of self.  
The two pivotal concepts articulated above are a demonstration that in telling this 
story, my place in the social field is not clearly situated. I have multiple identities which 
are characterised by shades of grey rather than black or white and which blur at their 
boundaries. As I write I am very much a ‘former patient’ having twice in my life received 
institutional care. Secondly, I am also an ongoing service user of mental health care 
provision. I receive both medical and psychiatric support from both the state and the 
voluntary sector. Thirdly, I am an active mental health service campaigner who 
remains committed to attempting to improve safe space facilities in my home town in 
the absence of a place of safety under the mental health legislation.  
Having introduced some key theoretical concepts and provided the context of debates 
over de-institutionalisation, a methodological account of the empirical approach to this 
paper needs to be addressed.  
 
Methodology  
Faulkner (2017) acknowledges the growing literature of ‘survivor-led’ research based 
on the experiential knowledge of former patients and service users. This tradition is 
underpinned by standpoint theory, as articulated by the likes of Harding (1993) and 
Tait and Lester (2005) in terms of the belief in utilising one’s own specific social 
location as a starting point for an informed enquiry. This tradition is much broader than 
mental health research. Feminist standpoint theorists have, for instance, taught us 
much about how knowledge is socially situated and about how this social situation 
gives the marginalised the ability to ask pertinent questions in their research. (See for 
example Flatschart, 2017). A not dissimilar set of assumptions are held by those 
engaged in some aspects of disability research, such as de Bruin,(2017), who talks 
about the tension between traditional experimental based research and more recent 
and ‘inclusive’ methodologies.  
In the mental health context specifically, much ‘survivor-led’ research focuses on 
autobiographical narratives which is not the explicit methodology used in this paper 
but the underpinning conviction that ‘storied knowledge,’ of the type alluded to by 
Weinstein (2010), Milligan et al. (2011) and Staddon (2013), should be of value in 
mental health research and practice is an implicit golden thread of this piece. Noorani 
(2013) contextualises this as the ‘expert by experience’ philosophy which gives equal 
primacy to ‘experiential authority’ compared with the ‘traditional authority’ of mental 
health professionals.  
 
What this paper represents is in many ways a conflation of ‘survivor’, ‘activist’ and 
‘service user’ discourses. According to Noorani (2013), as a response to the 
dominance of the medical model of mental health, ‘survivor’ discourses became 
popular in the 1970s, with ‘service user’ perspectives following a decade or so later 
with the rise of the new public sector managerialism and consumerist discourses in 
public sector governance.    
Rather than taking an autobiographical account, this paper utilises autoethnography. 
The 1970s witness the rise of this method, with the work of people like Karl Heider 
(1975) and Goldschmidt (1977).  It was not, however, until two decades later in the 
1990s, that the research practice became more accepted in academia due to what 
Adams et al (2014:8) refer to as an, “emerging appreciation for personal narrative”.  
At the heart of the ethos of autoethnography firstly, lies the belief that the personal 
perspective is central in understanding specific cultural experiences. Secondly, this 
method rejects some of the knowledge claims of more positivist epistemologies in 
terms of the idea that reality is ‘objective’ and waiting to be discovered. The approach 
gives primacy to the subjective because it is underpinned by the more interpretivist 
notion that the world is a social construct. Thirdly, the method is very much value-
centred rather than claiming to be value-free. (See Holman Jones et al. 2016)   
So having outlined a methodological approach, let’s turn now to my own journey of 
compulsion. 
 
A compulsive journey 
My diagnosis in 2003 as suffering from clinically defined Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder- the so called ‘Doubting Disease’ (Cefalu, 2010), is central to this research. 
As someone who suffers from a rare form of confessional OCD (see Kennemer, 2007), 
I was first admitted a place of safety in 2009. So my use of the ‘telling’ method of 
autoethnography is born partly of hope that others can find meaning in my struggles. 
My experiences as a mental health inpatient, service user and campaigner are 
intertwined with my academic orientation and for the autoethnographer this is part and 
parcel of accepting that, ““our lives and experiences are intertwined with our research 
projects and participants.” (Adams et al;. 2014: 9). Coping with OCD and the 
manifestations of its anxieties,  compulsions and rituals has become a way of existing 
just as autoethnographic accounts should be, “more than a research method” because 
they too are, “ a way of living” (Adams et al.: 20). (13) In acknowledging the intellectual 
influence of Romanyshyn (2007), Robertson et al. (2017) borrow the term the 
‘wounded researcher’ and utilise vignettes to articulate lived experience. The notion of 
my having multiple identities may not be the norm but there are others who have 
utilised autoethnography to reflect on their own diverse experiences. Liggins et al. 
(2013) for instance, in writing about places of healing is able to reflect critically on her 
multiple roles as compassionate observer, service-user and mental health care 
professional.  
I was treated for my OCD at The Margaret Stanhope Centre in my home town of 
Burton-on-Trent, starting off my treatment as a voluntary patient in January 2009 but 
when I became acutely ill and was sectioned several weeks later after being perceived 
to be at risk of harming myself. One year after I was discharged in the Spring of 2009, 
the South Staffordshire and Shropshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust announced 
consideration of closing the centre as part of a strategic review of mental health care 
provision. At this point, as a former patient of the facility, I was encouraged by fellow 
former patients and their carers plus some staff at the facility to launch a campaign 
group attempting to keep the facility open and thus the ‘Friends of Margaret Stanhope 
Forum’ was launched. At the conscious level I did this on a voluntary basis in good 
faith but upon reflection I have often wondered whether subconsciously I was using 
this as an opportunity to improve my feelings of self-worth and social status through 
galvanising my social capital and through activism which was resulting in public 
approval from those in my community.     
So my in autoethnographical journey is not of one but three selves. To explain this one 
has to go beyond the notion of ‘cognitive dissonance’ – a reductionist concept which  
assumes that self-identity can and perhaps should be fixed and coherent. A more 
sociologically informed concept which would allow for the co-existence of the multiple 
identities which characterise my existence would be the notion of the ‘Familiar 
Stranger’ Critically, Hall (2017) observes that self-identities are constantly evolving, 
shifting and that this is as much a change in social process and context rather than a 
dissonance of the mind. Whilst my autoethnographical account will inevitably be 
fragmented and ‘messy’ as is life itself, this is something to embrace according to 
Adams et al (2014:9) who have argued that, “we must embrace a research method 
that, to the best of its/our ability, acknowledges and accommodates mess and chaos, 
uncertainty and emotion”. By sharing my own experiences in this account I am in turn 
hoping to be able to appeal to others beyond my own ‘lived experience’. (See McIntosh 
and Wright, 2018). 
Autoethnographical research by academics who have experienced mental health 
problems is certainly far from unique as Campbell (2018) alludes to in her narrative 
about recovery from depression. Likewise autoethnographical research embarked 
upon by those suffering with OCD, like myself, is not altogether new as is one can see 
with the work of Brooks (2011: 251) who cites the contribution of Behar (1996) in 
terming this style of academic practice as, “writing vulnerably”. She does this in order 
to explain struggle offer an insight into how the manifestation of the illness involved 
a pendulum swing between public performance and compulsive private behaviour. 
I am therefore writing from a relatively disadvantaged standpoint as someone whose 
history of mental illness indicates a vulnerability in terms of involuntary detention in the 
future but I have alternative statuses which this paper will explore.   
So now let’s turn to my own autoethnographical accounts which involve those 
contradictions between my three identities.  
Identity as Former Patient 
August 2018 saw the devastating news that my mother was terminally ill with cancer. 
Almost immediately I could not sleep at all for days on end and I was barely able to 
eat- my body had gone into a state of shock. Three weeks or so later I was in need of 
institutional mental health care. Upon arrival at the George Bryan Centre in Tamworth 
in September 2009, despite being accompanied by my partner and her eldest son, I 
was too disorientated to know what possessions I had with me. I was, however, made 
aware that some of these possessions would be confiscated. As my partner revealed 
that I suffered from a confessional form of OCD, my mobile phone was locked away, 
for fear that I may make inappropriate phone calls to those in positions of authority, 
such as the police or my employer.  As well as this measure to protect my reputational 
safety, in order to ensure the risk of self-harm was minimised, I was made to remove 
my trouser belt, for fear I may have hung myself.  I recalled the same feeling of dread 
wash over me as I had when upon being admitted to the Margaret Stanhope Centre 
almost a decade earlier in 2009. Back then, I was promptly asked whether I felt safe 
and then reassured that I should feel “safe”. My lay knowledge of OCD leads me to 
believe that this was a well-intentioned mode of reassurance from a highly ethical and 
caring mental health care professional. This being said as a mode of reassurance this 
‘check’ that I felt safe served to inadvertently feed my insecurities and led to 
compulsive and self-harming behaviours. Over the next few days and weeks I drove 
my fingernails into my forehead causing my head to bleed and I needed medical 
treatment for this self-inflicted wound.  
A decade or so later in Tamworth, my daily routine of existence was shattered upon 
entry to the hospital and this is something which goes to the very heart of the issue of 
‘ontological insecurity’. Within hours of my admission to hospital in Tamworth in 2018, 
I became acutely aware of my practical insecurity. I feared physical victimisation from 
one or two male patients and began to experience what I perceived to be harassment 
from a young female in her early twenties, who had an eating disorder. I was followed 
everywhere by this female around the ward, even when I took myself to the end of the 
corridor to make private calls from a phone booth to my partner back at home. When 
my partner visited me, the young female concerned invaded our personal space and 
sat staring at her causing my partner to fear that she was just about to be physically 
attacked. Several weeks after admission, I began to be followed in a not dissimilar way 
by an older woman with a personality disorder, who was under section and who 
disclosed to me that she had found out my partner’s surname. This heightened my 
own anxiety about future visits from my own partner in terms of her own safety.  
My feelings of insecurity were exacerbated due to my fear of victimisation in terms of 
property theft. During the early phase of my month of hospitalisation I had no key to 
my room so was unable to lock my door. A fellow patient had complained that his 
clothes had gone missing from his room which was close to mine and when I checked 
my wardrobe, I believed my own clothes had been stolen. Feeling anxious and 
insecure I reported the ‘theft’, only to discover several hours later that my partner had 
in fact taken them home to be washed.   
As well as the fear of victimisation, in terms of Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs, I 
was insecure about the apparent lack of food on the ward. There seemed to be a 
scarcity of the daily sandwiches at tea time. Despite my clinical depression, I seemed 
to be extremely hungry during the weeks I spent on the ward and lost over a stone in 
weight. According to Giddens (1991: 98), “The predictability of the (apparently) minor 
routines of day-to-day life is deeply involved with a sense of psychological security.”  
At this point there was no identifiable ‘predictability’ because I was not used to the 
‘new’ routine. There was also a rumour on the ward that there was a lack of medication. 
This sent my anxiety skyrocketing as I was in a catatonic state of insomnia and 
believed that sleeping pills were my only hope of being able to get some kind of sleep. 
My insomnia was trapping me in a vicious circle of being anxious about not being able 
to sleep, and this lack of rest was in turn causing a heightened sense of anxiety. This 
is once more characteristic of ‘ontological insecurity. According to Giddens (1991: 98), 
“When such routines are shattered— for whatever reason— anxieties come flooding 
in, and even very firmly founded aspects of the personality of the individual may 
become stripped away and altered”.  
 
What is interesting is that on both occasions in my life that I have received institutional 
mental health care provision as an inpatient both my mother in 2009 and my partner 
in 2018 reminded me that, “You did everything you possibly could to get out of that 
place”.  
 
So having spent so much time attempting to ‘escape’ institutionalisation it’s worth 
addressing why I then spend a significant proportion of my time campaigning for the 
retention of those very institutions.  
Identity as campaigner for retention of mental health places of safety  
Back in October 2011 South Staffordshire Primary Care Trust launched a 3 month 
consultation on plans to close the centre and this intensified the efforts of 
campaigners, with the local newspaper ‘The Burton Mail’ launching the ‘Save Our 
Stanhope’ campaign, which both the Friends of Margaret Stanhope Forum supported, 
as did the local MP and a range of local councillors of all party persuasions. (See 
http://www.burtonmail.co.uk/…/Save-our-Stanhope-25102011.htm)   
One of the criticisms we endured as a patient led protest group was the accusation by 
NHS management that we were unhealthily fixated in place rather than quality of 
service of mental health delivery. Whilst refuting these suggestions, in my private 
moments I often questioned whether subconsciously, there may have been an 
element of truth in these challenges. Could it be that someone with a mental health 
condition like myself, had a need to be able to point to a physical place of safety in my 
own home town simply because it was identifiable, tangible and concrete- a kind of 
safety blanket which I needed to have to satisfy the demand for future certainly and 
security which my OCD was calling for if I became acutely ill in the future? NHS 
management were telling us that place and structure were no longer the issue but 
rather quality of service was paramount. 
 
One of the concerns raised by protestors including myself during the ‘Save Our 
Stanhope’ campaign was that mentally ill patients from Burton-on-Trent who needed 
institutional care, would increasingly be transported to The George Bryan Centre in 
Tamworth (where I would be treated almost a decade later). Tamworth’s institutional 
facility was approximately 17 miles and at least a 30 minute drive away. Campaigners 
argued that it was not unreasonable to assume that a good proportion of patients and 
their carers would have no alternative but to use public transport. Whilst on paper a 
train journey time between Burton and Tamworth looked an attractive proposition at 
just 11 minutes, it was noted that the train station was just over 3 miles away from the 
George Bryan Centre itself, which would mean additional costs would have to be 
incurred with a taxi ride. In terms of alternative modes of public transport, campaigners 
noted that there was no direct bus service between Burton and Tamworth. 
Back in 2009, when hospitalised in the Margaret Stanhope Centre which was less than 
2 miles from my home in Burton-on-Tent, I received daily visits from both of my 
parents. What seemed to facilitate my recovery after several months was a gradual, 
phased release back into the community. This began with being allowed off site for an 
hour to walk round the local recreational fields with my father and continued 
incrementally into four hour releases where I went home to be with my mother and 
father and then eventually was allowed overnight release, before eventually being 
discharged. My hospitalisation almost a decade later in 2018 was a somewhat different 
experience. The hour long round trip to Tamworth meant that my partner simply could 
not see me every day in balancing her work commitments along with my care. Her 
visits every few days involved snatched moments of conversation in the kitchen on the 
ward or in the garden at the George Bryan Centre. The kind of phased return which I 
had found beneficial when being treated in my home town back in 2009, was simply 
not the same a decade or so later due to logistical problems and travel time to and 
from the ward. As noted by Salisbury et al. (2016) this move to deinstitutionalisation 
has been supported by those who bemoan the dehumanising effects of being in a 
Goffman (1961) like ‘total institution’. As a patient I could relate to this but as a 
campaigner I was denying to both myself and others that I had found my experience 
to be dehumanising.  
My ‘campaigner’ identity presents a public face and local media image which is 
underpinned by the appearance of a firm conviction that I am a ‘pro’ the retention of 
both places of safety and ‘safe space’ facilities. By contrast, my identity as former 
patient is characterised by feelings of ambiguity over the value of institutional mental 
health care. Hall (2017: 16) provides insight with his observation that, “identity is not a 
set of fixed attributes, the unchanging essence of the inner self, but a constantly 
shifting process of positioning”. This notion of positioning is important because from a 
lay perspective I think that much of this occurs at the subconscious level. This is what 
Hall (2017: 210) conceptualises through the notion of, “unconscious modulations”. It’s 
not something I have been cognisant of. Indeed if I were overtly conscious of it, I would 
be open to the charges of insincerity, duplicity and bad faith. 
 
The waters become even more muddied and murky when one introduces a third 
identity- this time not patient nor campaigner but ‘service user’.  
 
Identity as Service User 
I have always struggled with the notion of being a ‘service-user’ because it’s a term 
which I associate with the New Right reform of the public sector as articulated by 
Clarke and Newman (1997) in accounting for the shift from a welfare to a managerial 
state. As a mental health campaigner I used to deliberately mock the use of the term 
when it was used by NHS management to argue that the mentally ill were no longer 
passive recipients of treatment but active ‘consumers’ who had a degree of choice. 
“Who chooses to be mentally ill in the first place?!” I would ask, deliberately invoking 
humour to provoke a supportive reaction from fellow campaigners and the public to try 
and ‘Save Our Stanhope’.   
Once again this reveals yet another fracture in terms of my self-identity. As I had done 
when hospitalised in the Margaret Stanhope Centre in 2009, I spent most of my time 
in the George Bryan Centre in 2018 trying to think of how I could get myself released 
from the very type of institution which I had campaigned so vehemently for! At that 
point I would have given anything to be a service-user being treated in the community 
rather than an inpatient.  
Upon discharge from the George Bryan centre, one month after admission, I received 
a visit from a social worker and psychiatrist. I was put in touch with the Horninglow 
clinic who monitored my wellbeing for several months. To this day I am a service-user 
in terms of having the ability to choose which counselling courses I wish to register for 
in terms of ongoing support and I remain very much a patient in terms of being 
administered prescribed medication for depression and anxiety by my GP. So how can 
my willingness to embrace my status as ‘service-user’ be squared with my mocking of 
that very term whilst wearing my campaigning hat? The notion of ‘hypocrisy’ is too 
reductionist and censorious a narrative to buy into and these contradictions need 
detailed discussion. So let’s now turn to trying to make sense of the contradictions of 
these multiple and often competing identities.  
Discussion 
The American sociologist William DuBois (1903) popularised the notion of ‘double-
consciousness’ at the beginning of the twentieth century. More than one hundred 
years later Hall (2017: 140) has spoken of those who feel a sense of “belonging to 
more than one world”. This is precisely my experience when moving between the 
planets of former patient, campaigner and service user. Hall (2017:16) continues that, 
“identity is always a never-completed process of becoming- a process of shifting 
identifications, rather than a singular, complete, finished state of being” and are 
therefore set in many ways, “in antagonistic positions”. (2017: 144) This failure to 
achieve what Hall (2017: 144) refers to as an “essential identity”, is far more than just 
a shift between personality states and that’s why although I do manage a long term 
mental health condition, namely OCD, it would be misplaced to pathologise issues of 
identity which have a profoundly social context.  
Hall (2017: 23) encourages us all to accept that, “Identity is never singular but is 
multiply constructed across intersecting and antagonistic discourses, practices and 
positions”. So in this sense we have to learn to accept that we will inevitably feel 
insecure as we shift between our multiple identities. At this point we can begin to link 
this sentiment with the aforementioned notion of ‘ontological insecurity’. (Giddens, 
1991). My identities are in a constant state of reconstruction, thus I cannot achieve 
ontological security. When consciously mobilizing my identity from former patient to 
campaigner, for example, my identities become problematized and there is inner 
discomfort. Hall (2017: 144) argues that, “No identities survive the diasporic process 
intact and unchanged, or maintain their connections with their past undisturbed”. 
Whilst the term ‘diaspora’ is ordinarily used to refer to displaced or scattered 
populations in migrant terms, in my own context it is my sense of secure self which 
has been scattered as I constantly travel the social distance between patient, 
campaigner and service user on my circular journey. So for me it is not so much a 
geographical scattering or dispersal but a social dispersal. Setting my campaign work 
aside, anyone who, like myself, experiences the daunting process of transition from 
inpatient back to outpatient will experience this in terms of how to renegotiate one’s 
sense of identity back into the private sphere or a household and family membership 
and the public sphere of work and one’s social life. My transition from inpatient to 
outpatient, for instance, signalled the beginning of the end of my three year marriage 
and I was once again a proverbial ‘single man’. 
The key is that there may be much that practitioners can learn from my diasporic 
experiences.   
 
Implications for policy and practice 
This paper continues to raise questions over the wisdom of de-institutionalisation 
which is in the realms of the political elite and policy makers, at the macro level of 
decision making. Whilst the government and health care providers have to consult with 
service users when planning and evaluating mental health care provision, perhaps a 
more immediate and realistic impact of practice would be to encourage a more 
prominent place for autoethnographic and experiential accounts of mental illness 
which could inform the training and development of mental health nurses, medical and 
psychiatric practitioners. At the ‘meso’ level, these practitioners ‘manage upwards’ 
their concerns over deinstitutionalisation to NHS policy makers and the wider political 
elite. The work of Kortteisto et al. (2018) articulates a growing global trend towards 
greater service user involvement in mental health care provision. So my call for the 
use of autoethnographic accounts from former patients, campaigners and service 
users to inform the training of mental health care workers is a realistic one. This being 
said it is likely to be met with at least some degree of resistance. From my own 
experience just because someone works in the mental health field does not mean that 
they themselves are not susceptible to holding some stereotypical and prejudiced 
views of the kind traditionally associated with wider society. During my 
institutionalisation in 2009 for example, I was informed that a group of former patients 
had expressed a desire to visit the facility and to talk to us current patients in an 
attempt to give us the proverbial emotional ‘lift’. In bemoaning this initiative, a mental 
health nurse said directly to me, “This is like letting the lunatics take over the asylum”.  
Inappropriate sentiments such as these should be contexualised with reference to 
Kortteisto et al’s (2018: 686) point that, “Mental health services have a history of 
containment, compulsion and stigma which may hinder the changes in culture and 
attitudes towards service user involvement”. If cultural resistance can be overcome,. 
Autoethnograohical accounts such as the one provided here have a small but 
significant part to play, with former patients and service users making a contribution 
as, “lived-experience educators” (Kortteisto et al. 2018: 686). We need to find spaces 
for former patients, service users and campaigners to help with the design, delivery 
and evaluation of mental health nursing training for instance- they should be 
encouraged into visiting fellowships, associate lectureships and external examiner 
panels in higher education.  
Policy and practice has to be evidence based and part of this is signposting towards 
future research in the field.  
 
Future Research  
Academics from all disciplines have an invaluable role to play in terms of informing 
future policy debates about deinstititionalisation as well as contributing to the training 
of mental health care professionals. Academics have an invaluable role to play through 
autoethnographical accounts because as a collective, they will be invested with the 
kind of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) and ability to be reflexive about their own 
experiences whilst at the same time being able to locate these experiences in broader 
social contexts. Hall (2017: 144) makes the call to, “think of yourself as diasporic” and 
I would appeal to academics to write as themselves of diasporic beings as patients, 
campaigners and/ or service users.  
Conclusions 
I have long struggled with my ‘real’ feelings about whether institutional mental health 
care provision is a good or a bad thing and this is precisely because of my different 
positions in the field. This paper is part of my ongoing journey towards acceptance 
that my self-identity will never be complete in. I remain what Hall (2017: 172) terms, 
“an uneasy traveller” between my three identities.  I am, however, more accepting that, 
“the imperatives of identification are perpetually paradoxical”. (Hall, 2017: 22). This 
submission is therefore a viewpoints paper in the plural rather than a viewpoint 
perspective in the singular. What Hall (2017: 172) has termed the “diasporic 
perspective” has the opportunity to provide, “a new vantage point, since by definition 
diasporas imply more than one positioning”. The real learning which papers like this 
have to offer lies in exploring these very contradictions which a dispersal of scattered 
identities can contribute to the debates on mental health care in the future.. 
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